We use semi-regular entities to denote the entities different from penetrates that participate in the protocol on behalf of themselves such as customers in e-commerce.
Introduction
Electronic transactions are protected by ecommerce protocols categorized as foundationprotocol to establish "secure tunnel" used by high layer protocols and application-protocols to complete electronic transactions through the "secure tunnel" established by the former. Formal methods are used to verify e-commerce protocols. It is called as honest assumption that all entities (except penetrates) comply with the analyzed protocol strictly. In our new method is a new conception: semi-honest entity (semi-regular strand) based on strand space model. Besides regular strand and penetrate strand, semi-regular strand is also redefined for dishonest participant. We also change protocol spaces and analyze TLS and IKE. Finally we find an attack on the IKE protocol using our method.
One-Way Hash Function
The original strand space model contains no description about hash function so it is added as a unary operator: hash: A → A, where A is a set of terms including all messages potential generated by a protocol. Accordingly, a new penetrate trace is added to the original set of penetrate traces: H: <-g, +hash (g)> [1] . Similar to the two axioms about operators "encr" and "join" in [2] , we have an axiom about hash Where K, Kp, T denotes set of all keys, set of keys known by penetrates and set of atomic messages respectively: 
Diffie-Hellman Exchange and Semiregular Strand with Node
Definitions 3.1 In a D-H exchange, the data exchanged between the two entities are g and h, and then we write the result of the exchange as dh (g, h). Definition 3.2 An entity X, if X knows a message m, then we say m∈ KNOWN X . Proposition 3.1 Suppose an entity X and a D-H exchange with exchanged data g and h, if g, h∈ KNOWN X , and g or h, at least one is originated by X, then dh (g, h)∈ KNOWN X . Definition 3.3 An arbitrary strand with some limitations is a semi-regular strand. The node on a semi-regular strand is a semi-regular node. 
The Transport Layer Security Protocol
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [3] is a version of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. Then we find an attack on the IKEAP protocol as: I → R: Ci, SAi, KEi, {I} kr , {Ni} kr ; R → V: Ci, SAi, KEi, {R} kv , {Ni} kv V → R: Ci, Cr, SAr, KEr, {V} kr , {Nr} kr , HASH_V; R → I: Ci, Cr, SAr, KEr, {R} ki , {Nr} ki , HASH_R I → R: Ci, Cr, HASH_I; R → V: Ci, Cr, HASH_R
Conclusions
Nothing can guarantee honesty even the honest entities in conventional analysis. Semi-honest entity likes a black box. The outer actions are identical to some specification and we know nothing about the inner actions. It is just a special case in Definition 3.3. To illustrate our method, we give TLS and IKE instances with hash function and D-H exchange added to the model. The spaces TLS I,R' , and IKEAP I,R' are used to prove guarantee for initiator and similar for responder. Analysis leads to a deeper insight into TLS, and the exact conditions ensuring the protocol's security. An attack that hides in the original strand space model on the IKE protocol is found, too. This work is supported by the G03-E5041450 and SRP (G03-Y1060140, Y1060150).
